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The private/public dichotomy has different meanings depending on the context and 
focus o f the inquiry. For the purpose o f  the following discussion, this inquiry is the 
extent to which society should participate in the provision o f child support.1 In this 
context, I will use the term “ public”  to refer to matters which are considered by 
society to require formal intervention by the legal system. I will use the term 
“ private”  to refer to those matters that society considers properly left to the 
discretion of the family, without formal public intervention other than to protect that 
discretion.
The focus for possible public intervention will not be the level o f support to 
which the child should be entitled. Accepting the public standard set for child 
support, the focus will be to determine whether the child actually receives that 
support! It is in this sense that a support system must be tested to determine whether 
it is truly child-centred. In applying this test, it is important to speak in terms o f the 
“ child’s right”  to receive support and not simply in terms o f the custodial parent s 
right to receive contribution towards support o f the child. This tends to avoid 
focusing attention on the issue of equity between the parents while forgetting the 
consequences to the child who does not receive support in accordance with the public 
standard.
In this paper, I suggest that a true child-centred support strategy must treat the 
custodial parent’s support obligation primarily as a public matter and not a private 
matter. In addition to the direct benefit that the child would receive from such a 
change, I will also suggest that it would tend to maintain equity between the spouses. 
Such an approach could remove disincentives for a non-custodial parent to pay child 
support. Society will benefit financially through lower social assistance payments and 
a reduction in the cost o f operating government support enforcement programs.
I will first briefly review the common law obligation of a parent to support a 
child prior to separation. The support obligation of parents under the Family Services
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Act will then be considered.2 First, the legislation will be assessed to determine 
whether, prior to family breakdown, child support is “ child-centred”  or “ parent- 
centred” .3 Second, the Family Services Act will be considered to determine what 
changes, if  any, occur upon the breakdown o f the family. Finally, the proposed 
Federal Child Support Guidelines will be reviewed to determine if  they are truly 
child-centred.
1. Traditional Child Support
Prior to the breakup o f the family unit, society has generally considered issues 
relating to the support and upbringing o f children to be private matters. The law 
continues to reflect a primary concern for the rights o f parents. For example, the 
Guardianship o f  Children Act4 provides that parents, as guardians, have custody of 
their child and the right to control the child’s education and upbringing.5 Aside from 
legislation such as the Family Services Act, the child has a right to support at a level 
determined at the discretion o f the parents. This follows from the concept o f custody 
and the parents’ right to control the upbringing o f the child.
It is difficult to speak of the rights o f the child at common law since they are 
limited and dependent on parental discretion. The common law even goes so far as 
to give the parent the right to claim the earnings o f the child in exchange for 
provision o f support, even though the parent did not use or require those earnings in 
order to support the child.6
One could characterize a parent’s right to set the level o f child support as a 
private right. O f course, society has long set minimum standards o f support through 
criminal sanctions and child protection laws enacted by the provinces.7 While the 
right o f a child to support is a public matter, child support is a private matter since 
it is provided by the parents in a manner and at a level left to their discretion . In 
fact, one could argue that the law is parent-centred in that it appears more interested
:R.S.N.B. 1973, c. F-2.2 (hereinafter the FSA).
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in the parent’s rights to control the upbringing o f the child, as long as the child is 
not starving and has sufficient clothing to withstand the elements, than it is in the 
rights o f the child.
Aside from statutes such as the Family Services Act, a child does not have a right 
to support beyond necessaries while the parents are cohabiting and certainly does not 
have a right to a level o f support commensurate with the family’s standard o f living.
2. The Family Services Act
i. Pre-Family Breakdown
The obligation of a parent under the Family Services Act to support his or her child 
is currently found in s. 113: “ Every parent has the obligation, to the extent the 
parent is capable o f doing so, to provide support, in accordance with need, for his or 
her child” .8 It is important to note that this provision is not limited to cases o f a 
breakdown of the family unit. Section 115 o f the FSA provides a procedure whereby 
the child or a parent on behalf o f the child may apply to the court for an order 
pursuant to s. 116.9 If  granted, the order would require the parent to provide support 
in accordance with the statutory standard.
While this provision confirms the existence o f an obligation to provide support 
and makes it clear that it is an obligation o f both parents, is the obligation parent 
centred or child-centred? The answer appears to be child-centred since the level o f 
support is based on the needs o f the child. These needs are defined in s. 115(6) of 
the Family Services Act and are certainly not limited to the bare necessities. For 
example, in determining the needs o f the child, the court is directed to take into 
consideration education reasonably within the ability of the child.10 These needs are 
to be met “ ... to the extent that the parent is capable of doing so.” 11 In summary, 
the level of support is to be determined by the court in accordance with a public 
standard and not left to the discretion o f the parents. In theory, a child’s right to 
support is child-centred to that extent.
*FSA, supra note 2.
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"Ibid. s. 113.
This raises interesting possibilities. For example, suppose that a seventeen year 
old child has just been accepted into university. She asks her parents for tuition to 
attend first year engineering.12 Both parents are professionals and certainly have the 
ability to provide this support. However, they refuse to do so since both came from 
poor backgrounds and had to work to put themselves through university. They 
believe that it will build character if  she has to put herself through school.
If  the child applies under s. 116 for an order requiring her parents to provide the 
necessary financial support, what might the decision of the court be? One would not 
be surprised to find the court concluding that the parent’s right to control the child’s 
upbringing is paramount to the child’s right to receive support at the level set by s. 
113 o f the Family Services Act. One can see this attitude in cases that allow parents 
to reduce their support payments based on the ability o f the child to earn income to 
assist in his or her own support.13 Perhaps we have not progressed as far from the 
common law right o f a parent to claim the earnings of a child as we would think. 
We at least hope that, if  this were the result o f the application, the parents’ decision 
was based on a true desire to build character and not in order to pay for their annual 
trip to Florida.
Notwithstanding the apparently clear statutory obligation to support a child in 
accordance with ability to pay, as a practical matter, the law continues to consider the 
means and level o f support to be within the discretion of the parents. Both the 
Family Services Act and judicial attitudes reflect a deference to the right o f a parent 
to control the child’s upbringing. In addition, the reality is that a child living at 
home will simply not make the application with respect to parents who are 
cohabiting.14
Therefore, prior to a breakdown of the family unit, it is difficult to identify a 
“ child’s right”  to support since support will be provided in a manner and at a level 
determined by the parents.
l2For this example, the child resides with her parents who are cohabiting.
13See FSA, supra note 2, s. 115(6)(b). See also cases noted in MacDonald & Wilton, supra note 9 at 225- 
226. One case indicated that a student in full time attendance at a university is expected to make 
reasonable efforts to assist in financing his or her education (Regan v. Regan, (Ont. Gen. Div.) Doc. No.
118/90, 25 July, 1991). Another case was summarized as finding that “ where children are being brought 
up to be responsible for themselves and can make some contribution to their own support they should do 
so.” (Mahony v. Mahony (1986), 3 R.F.L. (3d) 36 (Ont. H.C.)).
l4Where a child has left the parents’ home and is living with a relative, an application against cohabiting 
parents is possible. However, where the child has demonstrated an intention to be independent, section 
115(6)(n) o f the FSA (supra note 2) provides that this is a consideration in determining the amount o f  
support to which the child is entitled. See cases noted in MacDonald & Wilton, supra note 9 at 212 and 
227-228.
ii. Family Breakdown
W hat effect will the parents’ separation have on the child’s right to support? This 
question will be discussed in the context o f a situation in which one parent, usually 
the mother, is given custody o f the child.15 The consequences of separation will be 
considered first from the perspective o f the non-custodial parent and then by 
examining the effect separation has on the child’s right to receive support from either 
parent.
From the non-custodial parent’s perspective, what is the appropriate level o f 
contribution for support o f the child? Even if  the non-custodial parent is only 
ordered to pay support equal to the contributions made prior to separation, one might 
question the underlying basis for such an order. While the parent/child relationship 
certainly continues where one parent is granted custody o f the child, there is 
invariably some diminishment in that relationship.16 If  a link exists between the 
parent/child relationship and the obligation to support a child, an anomalous 
circumstance would arguably be created if  the parent/child relationship diminishes 
while the obligation stays the same or increases.
Does the law link the obligation to support a child with the existence of a 
parent/child relationship? The answer is an unequivocal yes. The principle of in loco 
parentis has long been recognized as a basis for requiring a person who is neither the 
biological nor legal parent o f a child to support that child.17 Yet, while the 
obligation is created on the basis o f that relationship, when that relationship 
terminates or is at least diminished, the parent’s legal obligation continues unabated. 
This appears to be somewhat anomalous and might be reason to inquire as to the 
treatment of non-custodial parents.
It should be noted that the issue of the level o f child support is sometimes linked 
to the financial contribution of the custodial parent. The custodial parent may argue 
that his or her financial contribution should be reduced to reflect the non-financial 
support services that he or she provides. The Federal/Provincial Committee on Child 
Support considered this argument in developing the proposed Federal Child Support 
Guidelines. After concluding that the custodial parent should be expected to 
contribute equally with the non-custodial parent, the Committee took the following 
position:
l5While custody may be joint, the issues discussed herein are highlighted in sole custody situations where 
the non-custodial parent is ordered to pay support. Joint custody may reduce some o f  the disincentives 
to the payment o f support that are inherent in the sole custody situations.
l6Certainly visitation rights allow for this as well as the co-operation o f the custodial spouse.
nFSA, supra note 2, s. 1 defines “ parent” to include “ a person with whom the child ordinarily resides
who has demonstrated a settled intention to treat the child as a child o f his or her family” . See also the 
Divorce Act, supra note 5, s. 2(2)(b) to the same effect.
Some arguments could be made against this position. For example, some might say 
that the custodial parent also gives time, and therefore should not be required to 
contribute as much money. On the other hand, because the non-custodial parent may 
also spend money directly on the child, and does not enjoy the benefits of living with 
the child, a lower payment could be more appropriate. These issues are probably 
impossible to resolve and are ignored here.18
The issue may or may not be possible to resolve, but there should be a recognition 
that the problem exists and an attempt made to deal with it openly.
Even if  one accepts that the required level o f support is appropriate, there are 
other significant consequences o f separation from the non-custodial parent’s 
perspective. These consequences may indirectly affect the support that the child 
actually receives. First, the non-custodial parent has lost the right to participate in 
the upbringing o f the child. Section 5(a) o f the Guardianship o f  Children Act 
provides that a parent/guardian’s right to control a child’s upbringing is “ subject to 
an order o f custody issued by a court o f competent jurisdiction” .19 Therefore, from 
the perspective o f  the non-custodial parent, the custodial parent will control the means 
and the level to which support will in fact be provided to the child.
Second, the non-custodial parent will be ordered to pay support determined in 
accordance with the public standard set by the Family Services Act. This will reflect 
the court’s determination o f the needs of the child and the ability o f the non-custodial 
parent to pay. The amount o f support could be equal to or higher than the amount 
that the parent was contributing before separation. In the example of the child 
requesting tuition to attend university, the parent could at least say “ no”  prior to 
separation. After separation, a non-custodial parent would probably be required to 
pay if  the custodial parent so wished.20
Turning to the child’s perspective, what effect does the separation and support 
order against the non-custodial parent have on the child’s right to support? Very 
little since the child’s right to support is still essentially a private matter. There are 
two reasons why one might reach such a conclusion. First, with respect to support 
paid by the non-custodial parent, the payments are usually ordered to be made to the 
custodial parent directly. Decisions as to the means and the extent to which the 
payments will be used to support the child are left to the custodial parent. The
'*An Overview o f  the Research Program to Develop a Canadian Child Support Strategy (Ottawa: 
Department o f Justice Canada, 1995) at 27, footnote 36.
'"’Supra note 4.
20It is acknowledged that the custodial parent’s ability to contribute may be relevant as well as the 
possibility that the child would be expected to make reasonable efforts to contribute. However, the issue 
would now be determined in a public forum and, as a practical matter, it is far more likely that the non­
custodial parent would be required to pay for this educational expense than would be the case prior to 
separation.
custodial parent is not required to account for the expenditure of the support 
payments received. Second, with respect to the financial contribution o f the custodial 
parent, his or her position is for the most part unchanged.21 These consequences 
also affect the non-custodial parent and can create disincentives to pay the support as 
ordered. For the benefit o f the child, a pragmatic approach may be required. Rather 
than focusing on enforcing compliance and balancing the equities between the 
spouses, understanding why non-custodial parents are not paying and dealing with 
those reasons may result in greater compliance. Greater compliance in turn means 
that more funds will be available for support o f the child. Increasing compliance can 
also be a strategy for a truly child-centred support system.
3. Public Intervention Required
i. The Case for Intervention
Aside from issues related to the diminishment o f the parent/child relationship, the 
above discussion points to two areas of concern: first, that custodial parents continue 
to be in the private sphere with respect to both the support payments received and the 
contributions that they are expected to make; and second, that there exist disincentives 
for non-custodial parents to pay support in accordance with the order. The result is 
that the child’s right to support at the level reflected in the Family Services Act is lost 
in a dispute that involves issues of parents’ rights and equity between the parents.
Public intervention is required in order to further the objective of creating a true 
child-centred support system. This could include the following.
— direct payments: the support order could provide that payments be made 
directly to a third party for the benefit o f the child rather than require that all 
payments be funnelled through the custodial parent;
— accounting: minimum requirements to account, at least sufficient to indicate 
that the support payments received were in fact expended to support the child, 
could be imposed on the custodial parent;
— enforcement o f the custodial parent’s obligation: the custodial parent could be 
required to contribute to the support o f the child in accordance with the same 
public standards to which the non-custodial parent is subject.
2'The Family Services Act does not appear to take non-financial contributions into account for the purpose 
o f  determining the financial contribution o f  the custodial parent. However, see cases noted by MacDonald 
& Wilton, supra note 9 at 215.
These initiatives might be incorporated into a child-centred support system. A 
comprehensive legislative scheme that recognizes the objective o f creating and 
enforcing the child’s right to support would be the preferred option. However, some 
changes might be possible within the parameters o f the current system. A few 
possibilities that might be considered under the present Family Services Act are noted 
below. These suggestions require a change in judicial attitudes towards the custodial 
parents’ right to control the upbringing o f the child.
ii. Greater Use of Direct Payment
Cases indicate that the non-custodial parent cannot receive credit for payments made 
directly to a third party for the benefit o f the child.22 To permit such credit could 
undermine the rights o f the custodial parent to control the upbringing of the child. 
However, the Family Services Act contemplates that direct payments to third parties 
could be ordered.23 It may be appropriate to expand the use o f such orders in an 
effort to maintain the involvement and commitment o f the non-custodial parent. This 
would only be feasible where relatively large or regular payments are required for the 
benefit o f the child. Also, care would have to be taken so that it would not appear 
to the child that the non-custodial parent is really in control.
Where there is a real concern that the support payments are generally not being 
expended for the benefit o f the child, other options should be contemplated. The 
Family Services Act provides that payments can be paid into court or to a suitable 
person or agency.24 The child would then be protected and the non-custodial parent 
would very likely be more comfortable making the payments. The court should not 
assume that the parent most suited to have custody is necessarily the best parent to 
deliver child support in a responsible manner.
iii. Accountability
The court could include a condition in the support order itself that would require (in 
the appropriate case) the custodial parent to provide some minimal accounting of the 
expenditure o f the payments received. The jurisdiction o f the court on such an 
application under s. 115(1) and s. 116(1) would appear to leave this possibility open.
"See cases noted in MacDonald & Wilton, supra note 9 at 226.
2*FSA, supra note 2, s. 115(1), 116( 1 )(h). The courts’ jurisdiction is to order a person to provide support. 
The method o f providing support is not stated. The jurisdiction to issue an order under s. 116 is not
limited to payments to the custodial parent. Section 116(1 )(h) authorizes payments to an appropriate 
person on behalf o f  the child. If necessary, this could be the basis o f a payment directly to a third party 
for the benefit o f  the child.
A minimal level o f accountability could raise the comfort level for the non-custodial 
parent who is concerned about the expenditure of the support.
In cases of misapplication o f support payments, further controls would be 
required. The custodial parent would appear to be the “ suitable person”  within s. 
116( l)(h) and be receiving the payments on that basis. Support payments are 
therefore made to the custodial parent on behalf o f the child and not the parent who 
may have made the application. They are property beneficially owned by the child 
and not the parent. The Guardianship o f  Children Act could be utilized with respect 
to misappropriated payments in the same manner as with any other property of the 
child.25 The non-custodial parent could perhaps initiate a proceeding under that Act 
as a guardian to determine the issue. General principles of trust law perhaps could 
also be invoked in the appropriate case. The court would have to be vigilant to 
ensure that such procedures were not used as a means of harassing the custodial 
parent.
iv. The Custodial Parent’s Contribution
The custodial parent may have income and be able to contribute to the support o f the 
child. Once the needs o f the child are determined, the contributions will be allocated 
between the parents. The current approach to support tends to treat the needs of the 
child as more or less static and not relative to the combined income of the parents.
Where it appears that the custodial parent is not contributing as assumed and that 
the total needs of the child are not being met, what should the response be? In one 
case, the court was o f the view that a custodial parent was not exerting herself in 
contributing to the support o f the child.26 While there is a legitimate concern that 
the custodial parent contribute, the solution focuses on equity between the parents and 
not on the child. Using this approach, the child suffers.
A better response can be illustrated by returning to the example of the child 
requesting tuition to attend university. Assume the custodial parent applies on behalf 
o f the child for an order that the non-custodial parent pay the full tuition. If  the 
court determines that both parents have an equal ability to contribute, the court would 
probably order the non-custodial parent to pay one half o f the tuition. The needs of 
the child are met in accordance with the ability of the parents to provide support. 
However, the custodial parent may then decide that in order to build character, the 
child should work to help put herself through university. This highlights the 
discrepancy between the child-centred public level o f support to which the non-
25Supra note 4, ss. 2(1), 5(b).
26In MacDonald & Wilton, supra note 9 at 224.
custodial parent is subject and the parent-centred private level o f support to which the 
custodial parent is subject.
Could the non-custodial parent apply for an order against the custodial parent to 
the effect that he or she pay the other half o f the tuition? Section 115 of the Family 
Services Act allows a parent to apply for a support order on behalf o f a child and is 
not limited to custodial parents. If  there was a concern as to who would receive the 
payment, this could easily be resolved by an order that each parent pay his or her 
share directly to the university.
While this possibility may appear extreme, it ensures that a child receives the 
support to which he or she prima facie  has a right. It would restore equity between 
the parents and thereby reduce what might otherwise be a disincentive for the non­
custodial parent to make the payments as ordered.
4. The Federal Child Support Guidelines
The Federal Child Support Guidelines were presented by the Government o f Canada 
as a child-centred support strategy.27 Its stated objective is that the child receive the 
benefit o f the income o f both parents.28 The assumption underlying the Guidelines 
is that the parents will contribute equally to the support o f the child. The level o f 
support expected from the non-custodial parent will be a portion o f his or her income. 
The portion to be paid will reflect the normal or average contribution to the support 
o f a child expected o f a parent earning that amount of income. In setting this 
contribution, the Guidelines assume that the custodial parent is earning and 
contributing an equal amount.29 Based on these assumptions, one might expect that 
the amount o f support ordered under the Guidelines would be less than that currently 
being ordered. However, the impression is that the amount o f support ordered will 
generally increase under the Guidelines.
The child-centred aspect o f the Guidelines is that the child will receive the benefit 
o f the combined income o f both parents. This re-defines the child’s right to support 
as relative, not static. However, the proposed Guidelines are deficient in some 
respects and raise concerns in the context o f the previous discussion. First, there are 
no provisions to ensure that the custodial parent will in fact contribute as assumed. 
Thus, while this approach is certainly child-centred, there is still only public
27“ Federal Child Support Guidelines” in Budget 1996: The New Child Support Package (Government
o f Canada, 6 March 1996). An explanation o f  the proposed changes to the Divorce Act to implement a 
new child support strategy.
2HIbid. at 6.
intervention with respect to the non-custodial parent’s contributions. To the extent 
that these Guidelines are not accompaniedby mechanisms to ensure the requisite level 
o f support from the custodial parent, the system remains a parent centred system.
The second result o f the proposed Guidelines may be to create disincentives for 
the non-custodial parent to pay the support as ordered. This can be traced to two 
consequences o f the approach taken under the Guidelines : the expected increase in the 
amount o f support orders; and the fact that the support order will not be reduced 
based on the income of the custodial parent. The first issue raises concerns 
previously discussed: whether the parent/child relationship has been diminished; the 
need for direct payments; and increased accountability. The second issue relates to 
the assumption that the custodial parent will in fact be contributing. When the non­
custodial parent asks for an explanation of why the payments are not being reduced, 
it will be of little satisfaction to hear the rationale if the perception is that the 
custodial parent is not in fact contributing.
W hile it is not clear how this is to be accomplished, the federal government 
intends to encourage the provinces to apply these Guidelines in cases governed by 
provincial law. This might be difficult in provinces, such as New Brunswick, where 
support is ordered based on the ability and needs test found in the Family Services 
Act. The needs of the child are calculated in a manner which results in a relatively 
static amount of support. This amount may even be reduced where the child 
contributes or has the ability to contribute towards his or her own support. The net 
cost is then divided between the parents based on their relative ability to contribute. 
The Guidelines are based on assumptions that are inconsistent with the current 
provincial system. The child’s right to support is not based on needs but on a portion 
o f the parent’s income. There is no calculation o f the cost o f support. Further, under 
the Guidelines, the non-custodial parent’s contribution will not be reduced 
notwithstanding the ability of either the child or the custodial parent to contribute. 
Without amendments to the provincial legislation, it is questionable whether the 
Guidelines could be applied or implemented other than as a general starting point for 
the court.30
While the approach adopted in the Guidelines is child-centred, it does not go far 
enough and as a consequence may increase enforcement problems. The net result for 
the child may be less support rather than more.
30Section 113 would have to be amended to refer to the Guidelines which would become a Schedule to 
the FSA. Section 115(6) would have to be amended so as not to apply to child support.
5. Conclusions
A truly child-centred support system must set an appropriate level o f support and 
ensure that the child actually receives that level o f support. Thus, a child-centred 
support system cannot focus solely on the enforcement o f support orders and 
characterize the problem as one o f “ deadbeat dads” . It appears that greater public 
intervention in the provision o f support by the custodial parent might be a part o f a 
truly child-centred support system. This is not an issue o f equity between the 
spouses, but a question o f the child’s right to receive support.
Even if  public intervention in the provision o f support may not be desirable prior 
to the separation o f the parents, there are pragmatic reasons why it might be 
considered after separation. An anomaly appears to exist when one spouse is subject 
to a public standard and the other is not. This is particularly a concern when, as is 
the case under the proposed Federal Guidelines, the non-custodial parent’s obligation 
is premised on the assumption that the custodial parent is contributing his or her 
share. Equity between the spouses becomes relevant to the issue o f child support to 
the extent that inequity, or perceived inequity, results in a reduced compliance with 
the support order.
Changes relating to accountability and direct payment might ensure that the child 
receives the requisite level o f support and increase compliance with support orders. 
Some o f these changes could be incorporated with a change in judicial attitudes. To 
be properly implemented they should be considered as possibilities in a legislative 
reform package after full consideration.
While the proposed Federal Child Support Guidelines reflect a child-centred 
support system, they continue to focus on the obligations of the non-custodial spouse. 
The problem cannot be defined solely in terms of “ deadbeat dads” . This turns the 
attention from the public responsibility to provide for the welfare o f children and 
attempts to make it a private responsibility. Government responsibility to deal with 
child poverty cannot be avoided in this manner. The right o f a child to support is a 
matter that is properly in the public sphere. However, the tendency to focus on the 
responsibility o f “ dads”  also diverts attention from the responsibility o f “ moms” . 
This in turn tends to keep their responsibility in the private sphere.
There are no easy solutions to ensure that children receive the support to which 
they are entitled. This paper attempts to raise questions that must be addressed 
openly in order to develop a system that is truly child-centred.
